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 Among the many topics in the philosophy of law one has always been 
central to me: the relationship between law and justice.  Law does many things: It 
creates institutions, facilitates transactions, gives incentives for socially beneficial 
behavior, deters misconduct, manufactures social realities.  But one thing law 
does especially is legitimate power, both just power and unjust power.  Law’s 
ability to legitimate is the source of the nested opposition between law and 
justice.  Law is never perfectly just– indeed, it is often not very just at all.  And 
yet it is an indispensable condition for justice. 
 
 “Legitimate,” like “sanction,” is a Janus word, one that refers 
simultaneously to a concept and its opposite.  To “legitimate” means to bring 
power under the rule of law so that it is (sufficiently) just, impartial, or otherwise 
worthy of respect.  But to “legitimate” also means to apologize for or mystify the 
exercise of power so that it seems to be just, impartial and worthy of respect 
whether or not that is so.  
 
 The dual nature of “legitimate” is the central concern of a critical theory 
of law.  Critical theories ask how law legitimates power in both senses of the 
word: how it shapes, channels and restrains power and how it mystifies, disguises, 
and apologizes for it.  In addition, a critical theory of law asks how the very acts 
of  making, interpreting and applying law – and thus of legitimation in both 
senses – produce and proliferate ever new forms of power, both just and unjust. 
 
 You might think that a critical theory would focus primarily on law’s 
ideological effects.  But there is more to it than this.  First, a critical theory must 
be as concerned with how law might succeed in furthering justice as it is with 
how law disguises injustice.  Second, older Marxist-inspired models of ideology 
as obfuscation or distortion hardly do justice (pardon the pun) to law’s versatile 
powers of legitimation.  Law does not merely mask or apologize for power, nor 
does it merely restrain it. Instead, law creates ever new forms and methods for 
                                                          
1 Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law School.  My thanks 
to Mary Dudziak, Bob Gordon, Sandy Levinson, Linda Meyer, Matthew Palmer, Mike Seidman 
and Mark Tushnet for their comments on previous drafts. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1083846




exercising power. Here Foucault’s model of social relations is at least as 
important as Marx’s. Law proliferates power by making itself true in the world. It 
generates new institutions, new conventions, and new social realities, and it 
generates new forms of professional knowledge about all of them. It shapes the 
imagination of those who live under it around the categories and institutions that 
it produces. Law does not simply distort the world – or even merely represent it 
correctly; rather it makes a world, one in which and through which we live, act, 
imagine, desire and believe.2 
 
 A critical theory views law ambivalently as a method for legitimating (in 
both senses of that wondrous word) the exercise of power in society.  The word 
“ambivalence” comes from the Latin; it means having strength or effects on both 
sides.  (And hence, this dual effect often produces mixed emotions).  We should 
distinguish an ambivalent conception of law from a pejorative conception.3 A 
pejorative conception views law fundamentally as an ideological practice for 
mystifying and legitimating injustice.  By contrast, an ambivalent conception of 
law means that we see both the beneficial and harmful aspects of  law – both 
law’s ability to further its purported goal of a just social order  and its ability to 
fall away from that goal and to mystify and apologize for that failure.  Law may 
offer an unjust and unwieldy system for apprehending, incarcerating, and 
destroying human beings.  It may also offer important elements of procedural 
fairness, equality and human dignity.  It does both of these things simultaneously, 
and it may be difficult to fully separate its harmful and beneficial aspects in 
practice.  Justice and injustice, responsiveness to the world and mystification, are 
often inextricably bound together.  In the pejorative conception, law is simply 
idolatry, a confused and contradictory mode of discourse, a technique of apology 
and disguise. In the ambivalent conception, law is both ideology and promise; it 
can be one resource among others in a project of political redemption. 
 
 Critical legal theorists of the 1970s and 1980s asked whether law was a 
kind of politics, and whether the discourse of rights was beneficial or harmful to 
justice and human flourishing.  When people speak of the relationship between 
law and “politics,” they mean law’s relationship to the many different forms of 
power – economic, social, cultural, political, military and technological – that law 
might constrain, enable, or propagate.  They also mean the ideals, ideologies and 
arguments that people use to justify these forms of power.  “Politics” refers to 
people’s contrasting visions and to the values that they want to realize or 
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recognize in public life.  But it also refers to the power to realize or recognize 
those values and visions.  So when we consider the relationship between “law and 
politics” we are also interested in the question of law and power – how people 
justify and legitimate power – either directly or indirectly – through law.  And we 
must also account for law’s own methods of proliferating its own power, whether 
it be through legal concepts, legal institutions, legal culture, legal education, legal 
officers, or the legal profession. 
 
 In any case, law is not simply politics; rather it is a surprisingly plastic 
medium of discourse about power and for the exercise of power.  Law mediates, 
colonizes, and transforms political and cultural struggle into legal doctrines and 
legal disputes, and in doing so, constructs a new kind of power—the power of 
legal knowledge and institutions—that hopes to become indispensable to every 
other form.  Law spreads and is implemented through institutions and practices 
that call on law or depend on law, and through a professional culture that treats 
law as of the highest importance, indeed, as central to civilization itself.  Through 
legal arguments and legal institutions political struggle and ideological 
disagreement become refracted and displaced, only to resurface in ever new 
guises.  Legal institutions and legal argument facilitate the exercise of power (and 
struggles over power) while tempering  and redirecting them.  Law 
simultaneously channels and facilitates, restrains and multiplies the different 
forms of power in society – whether economic, social, cultural, political, military 
or technological – while proliferating its own forms of power, its own 
professional culture and its own authority.  This complicated relationship between 
law and power is law’s relative autonomy.  
 
 Three decades ago, critical legal scholars saw relatively little value in 
law’s relative autonomy.  They pointed out that if law were only relatively 
autonomous in this way, law would usually tend to reflect the most powerful 
interests in society at the expense of  weaker interests.  Worse yet, legal 
institutions and legal arguments would disguise this phenomenon, attempting to 
show that injustices committed in the name of law were required by legal 
reasoning, by legal impartiality, by procedural regularity and by the values 
inherent in the rule of law.  Law would contribute to and apologize not only for 
the dominant forms of power in society, but also for many different forms of 
subordination and injustice. 
 
 The argument was twofold.  First, legal rhetoric often mystifies and 
legitimates injustice perpetrated through law.  Second, despite the surface 
appearance of reasoned elaboration, procedural regularity and impartiality, legal 
reasoning is often indeterminate or under-determinate.  More precisely, 




substantial parts of the law or aspects of the law (like procedure and fact-finding) 
are sufficiently open textured in enough areas and on enough questions that clever 
lawyers and judges can often reshape its doctrines or its application with 
sufficient cognitive effort.  By generating new ways of interpreting laws and 
precedents, by jousting over application and procedure, and by describing and 
redescribing the facts, the most powerful forces in society can often shape the 
practical force of law largely to their liking.  They can do this both in terms of the 
substantive content of legal doctrines and in terms of how they would be applied 
to facts – as the law found and interpreted those facts. Even if doctrine is clear, 
application may be contested, even if application is straightforward, fact-finding 
can be controverted, even where the facts are clear, procedural hurdles can be 
erected. All other things being equal, the most powerful groups and individuals 
tend to enjoy greater success in shaping the content, force and application of law 
because they often enjoy greater access to lawmakers, courts and quality legal 
counsel, because they can devote more resources to legal representation and 
lobbying, or because they can afford to make systematic and strategic use of the 
legal system over extended periods of time. 
 
 Because lawyers’ and judges’ rhetorical efforts can take advantage of 
law’s many opportunities for innovation and contestation, the practical effect of 
legal rules and their application tends toward the vector sum of the different 
modes of power in society.  The most powerful forces generally make the greatest 
use of law; they will tilt the substantive content of law to their interests, or, failing 
that, the way that the law is applied and enforced in practice.  Conversely, the 
substantive content of law often proves least helpful to the least powerful groups; 
and often will be applied and enforced in practice to their relative detriment.  
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., speaking of his career as lawyer and judge, once said 
that his epitaph should read “Here lies a supple tool of power.”4  Critical scholars 
might argue that Holmes’ epitaph describes not only his career but the entire legal 
system.  Law – even a relatively autonomous law – is a supple tool of power. 
 
 Critical theory’s concern with law’s under-determination and plasticity 
captures only half the story.  Indeed, there is no necessary correlation between 
indeterminacy and illegitimacy.  Law’s plasticity and indeterminacy might help 
disguise and mystify injustices, but they might also promote adaptability and 
facilitate progress.  A determinate law might avoid manipulation by powerful 
interests.  But determinate legal norms – even when applied impartially – can be 
substantively unfair or tilted toward the interests of the powerful.  Determinacy 
foments injustice as much as indeterminacy ever did if the rules are unjust rules, 
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or if they tilt inequitably toward some groups over others. 
 
 Perhaps even more important, implicit in the idea of law’s relative 
autonomy is a contrary point.  Even if law is a supple tool of power, law also 
serves as a discourse of ideas and ideals that can limit, channel and transform the 
interests of the powerful, sometimes in unexpected ways that the powerful can not 
fully control.  Law is a tool of power that can become important and even 
indispensable to power.  People have to justify what they want to do through it.  
Perhaps the tools of law can not fully dismantle the forces of injustice.  But the 
proliferation of law and legal institutions also shapes and constrains how people 
can justify their actions and what they can do, both for good and for ill.  In this 
way law and legal culture-- as technologies and methods of justifying and shaping 
power-- also become political resources for limiting and channeling what 
powerful people and institutions can do. 
 
 The relative autonomy of law from politics – rather than its complete 
autonomy – simultaneously poses a threat and a promise.  The threat is that law 
will fail to do much more than ratify and legitimate the interests of the powerful; 
the promise is that it might hold off the worst excesses of power by giving people 
discursive and institutional tools to talk back to power, to restrain its selfishness 
and inhumanity, and to imagine finer, better visions of human association. 
 
 The threat and the promise of law are joined together inseparably.  What 
gives law its power to legitimate is its ability to re-describe unjust and unfair 
events, social practices and institutions in terms of valued ideals of human 
association like consent, freedom, dignity, equality and fairness. In the hands of 
lawyers and politicians, law can disguise, mystify and legitimate great injustices 
using the very ideas and ideals we admire.  But law can only do this because it 
appeals to these values and claims to try to put them into practice through law.  
Recourse to law forces the powerful to talk in terms in which the powerless can 
also participate and can also make claims. 
 
 From this standpoint, law is not simply an efficient tool of power that 
powerful people and powerful groups can wield any way they like.  They do not 
merely shape the world with it; rather it shapes them and their world, because 
they have bought into law as a means of achieving and wielding power.  Law 
shapes their beliefs and desires, their sense of the appropriate and the 
inappropriate, their conceptions of the possible and impossible.  Law generates its 
own institutions and its own demands; it creates its own culture, it is its own form 
of life; it struggles with other forms of knowledge and power for dominance.  
That struggle might lead to yet another form of professional power displacing 




older ones.  But it might offer a space for something far more beneficial and 
noble. 
 
 The critical approach to law—or at any rate, my version of it—has always 
been doubled, has always reflected the Janus word “legitimate.”  On the one hand, 
powerful people have used law to subordinate others and secure their own 
interests under the guise of promoting laudable goals like freedom, equality, 
liberty, consent, community and human dignity.  On the other hand, by choosing 
to speak in the language of law, powerful people and interests can sometimes be 
called to account because they try to legitimate what they are doing in those 
terms.  The people they take advantage of can argue that this is a misuse of law, 
an illegitimate attempt at mystifying rhetoric.  They can appeal to the values that 
law seeks to protect to promote better, more just, and more humane practices and 
forms of human association. 
 
 Important theoretical debates among critical scholars in the 1970s and 
1980s period revolved around which conception of law was the best one.  Some 
critical scholars adopted a largely pejorative conception, focusing primarily on 
law’s defects.  They argued that the rule of law was enmeshed in irreconcilable 
contradictions; they denounced rights talk as sterile, useless and 
counterproductive.5  Others, especially feminist and critical race theory scholars, 
pointed out that rights discourse and rule of law values were among the few 
resources that disempowered people had.6  Rule of law and rights talk were 
potentially emancipatory discourses.  They held a limited but important potential 
for liberation and for contesting the arbitrary and unjust use of power. 
 
 These feminist and critical race theorists understood the deemphasized 
                                                          
5 The most famous account is Mark V. Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 
(1984);  see also Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393 (1988); Frances 
Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387 (1984); Peter 
Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 
TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1984); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 
BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979); for a retrospective and renewed defense of the critique of rights, see 
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIECLE) 315-338 (1997); Duncan 
Kennedy, “The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies,” in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 
178 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002). 
6 Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in 
Anti-Discrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Patricia S. Williams, Alchemical 
Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 
(1987); Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: 
Perspectives From the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986). 
Critical Legal Theory Today 
 7
elements – the other side – of critical claims about the relative autonomy of law.  
They well recognized that rule of law values and rights discourse were hardly 
perfect – after all, they had been used repeatedly to justify slavery and the 
subordination of women – but that they had also allowed people to speak out 
against and to restrain the worst excesses of power.  Even in a period of deep 
skepticism and disillusionment about what law could do, these critical scholars 
retained a sense of the political importance of rule of law values and rights 
discourse.  That is not because they believed in a strict autonomy of law from 
politics, but because they understood the political values that legal culture and 
rights discourse might serve. 
 
 The best version of critical theory, I think, employs an ambivalent 
conception of law rather than a pejorative conception: it recognizes law’s relative 
autonomy from other forms of power in social life, and it understands the dual or 
Janus-faced nature of that relative autonomy.  It sees both law’s limitations in the 
face of power and its possibilities as a means of channeling power and preventing 
its most serious injustices. 
 
Moreover, I think that a critical approach must always be self-critical – it 
must recognize that how we make and apply legal theory arises out of the 
circumstances in which we recognize problems and articulate solutions.  Theory 
may purport to be timeless, but what theory means in practice, how we should 
apply it, and which of its elements gain particular relevance, will change with 
changing times.  A critical theory of law must recognize how different aspects of 
law—and of a critical theory of law itself—become newly salient or refigured in 
different circumstances, and how the seemingly timeless verities of one historical 
period are conditioned by the assumptions and expectations of that time.  Critical 
legal theory is no exception.  If a critical theory of law looks different today than 
it appeared thirty years ago, that is because the world itself looks different. 
 
 The critical project in American law arose in a unique period in American 
legal history.7 During the 1960s American law had made enormous gains in 
promoting equality for the poor, for racial minorities, and for women, and greatly 
expanding the scope of civil liberties.  In a few short decades the country had 
become far freer and more equal, and law – and the discourse of rights – had 
seemed to play an important part of the transformation.  And when the Nixon 
Administration tried to subvert American democracy in the early 1970s, the 
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Constitution and the rule of law seemed to provide key elements in the resolution 
of the crisis.  Both the Watergate scandal and the Civil Rights Revolution seemed 
to demonstrate that law and rights discourse played an important role in 
promoting a just society.  The law could not have succeeded without political 
mobilization and political will behind it.  But law was a key institutional medium 
– and the language of rights a key discourse – through which progress was 
achieved. 
 
 But these gains – and the power of law to effect them – had stalled and 
slowed by the middle of the 1970s, due to a series of reactions and counter-
mobilizations from different segments of society.  The result was continuing 
improvement in some areas, retrenchment in others, and stalemate in still others.  
There was no promise anytime soon of another round of truly transformative 
changes toward greater liberty and equality.  Instead, progress was halting and 
inconsistent. 
 
 The critical movements in American law arose in this period, when the 
liberatory edge of law had been blunted and the tectonic plates of American 
politics slowly shifted.  From this perspective, key critical claims – that law 
reflected political struggles and political power, that rights discourse was 
manipulable and could easily be turned against progressive ends, and that legal 
argument often apologized for continuing injustices – made particular sense.  As 
forces of reaction set in, the law once again appeared as a flexible tool of the 
powerful, and claims of law's impartiality a powerful rhetoric of mystification. 
 
 Critical scholars rebuked their liberal colleagues in the academy as 
apologists for a status quo that, they believed, still had far to go.  Frustrated with 
law's inability to do good, and disgusted with complacent assertions of law’s 
impartiality, they attacked the liberal defenders of the rights revolution and the 
rule of law as little better than their conservative adversaries.  Whether or not this 
accusation was fair, it was surely deeply ironic.  At this very moment in history 
the United States had already entered a period of political retrenchment, in which 
liberals would lose most of their influence and authority over the development of 
American law, although at the time people had no idea how long the period of 
retrenchment would last and how deep it would run.  By directing their critical 
focus at the liberal legal academy, critical scholars ironically (and contrary to 
what their own theories would have advised) paid comparatively less attention to 
the most powerful forces in American society, forces that would significantly 
change the direction of law in the next several decades. 
 
 By the turn of the twenty-first century, new conservative social 
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movements dominated American politics.  Their agenda was very different from 
that of the progressive forces of the 1960’s – indeed, it was in some sense a 
reaction to it.  Today the critical project of debunking legal liberalism and rights 
discourse to clear space for greater justice seems beside the point. The problem 
today is not that liberal theories of law mask deep injustices, but that the rule of 
law itself has been cavalierly discarded in the quest for political power. The 
events of the early twentieth-first century have made the other side of the 
ambivalent conception of law particularly salient. 
 
As the new century began, the Supreme Court of the United States settled 
a disputed Presidential election in Bush v. Gore8 by inventing a novel legal theory 
which did not even justify its remedy of stopping all recounts, and which, the 
Court suggested, it would be unlikely to apply to any future decisions.  The 
reasoning was so weak and ad hoc by professional standards of legal argument 
that it appeared that the majority simply wanted to end the contested election in 
favor of the Republican candidate, George W. Bush. 
 
 Once in office, the Bush Administration’s proclamation of a “war on 
terror” following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks made repeated assaults, 
some subtle, and some not so subtle, on key rule of law values of transparency, 
accountability and constraints on arbitrary power, particularly executive power. 
To give only a few examples: The Administration rounded up thousands of Arab 
and Muslim immigrants shortly after the 9/11 attacks and held them for months 
without charging them or disclosing their identities to the public.  It held two 
American citizens in military prisons and claimed that they had no right to an 
attorney or to a judicial hearing to contest their designation as enemy combatants.  
Its secret Torture Memos justified torture and prisoner abuse by defining torture 
absurdly narrowly and by claiming presidential power to disregard statutes and 
treaties banning torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.  It 
maintained secret prisons overseas where it tortured and abused detainees, it sent 
others off to be tortured by different governments, and it stashed still others at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to avoid the reach of American courts.  It created military 
commissions to hold secret trials that permitted secret evidence the accused could 
not examine and secret witnesses whose identity the accused could not know. It 
began a series of secret and illegal domestic surveillance programs whose nature 
and scope it will not divulge, asserting that any attempt to litigate their validity 
would endanger national security and aid terrorists.  And yet, as troubling as all 
these actions have been, the erosion of legal institutions may become far worse if 
Americans experience a second terrorist attack. 
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To be sure, one might insist that recent events have merely demonstrated 
conclusively that law was politics, that the rule of law was useless in combating 
injustice or constraining power, and that rights discourse was indeterminate and 
manipulable.9  Bush v. Gore did make legal arguments, even if they were 
transparently bad ones. Legal claims accompanied every incursion on American 
constitutionalism in the years following 9/11, and well-trained lawyers have been 
only too happy to justify the Bush Administration’s every move – no matter how 
egregious – as fully consistent with the law.  Indeed, government officials 
working in the Vice-President’s office and in the Justice Department’s Office of 
Legal Counsel developed novel legal theories claiming that when the President 
acted in his capacity in Commander-in-Chief, he could not constitutionally be 
bound by laws passed by Congress or by international human rights treaties.  
According to these theories, none of the President’s actions were outside the law: 
rather the law effectively gave him the powers of a king or a dictator. 
 
 Moreover, in some cases the Administration did not even need to 
manipulate the law.  It repeatedly used the threat of terrorism-- and accusations of 
being soft on terrorism-- to goad Congress into passing new laws that created 
military commissions, authorized searches without judicial supervision, abolished 
habeas corpus for suspected aliens, and expanded the government’s powers of 
electronic surveillance. 
 
 Yet even while professional discourses and institutions of law assisted 
these actions, they also provided methods for restraining the Administration’s 
worst excesses.  Courts repeatedly rejected the President’s most outrageous 
claims even if they upheld more modest powers.  The professional discourse of 
law served as a partial check on executive aggrandizement.  Perhaps equally 
important from the perspective of a critical theory, the political ideals of the rule 
of law – that legal institutions should restrain arbitrary power and impose norms 
of procedural fairness and impartiality – served as a powerful force both in 
American popular thought and in American legal culture.  Whether or not any 
particular law or decision lived up to the ideals of the rule of law, both the 
American public and American lawyers and judges believed in those ideals.  They 
fought back when they believed those values were threatened. 
 
 The ideals of human association embedded in the concept of the rule of 
law – like the ideals of liberty and equality – are well worth fighting for and 
realizing in our legal institutions, even (and especially) if we realize that all 
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efforts to instantiate them in law are always subject to evasion, capture, and 
manipulation.  In the world of the 1970s, critical theory noted how law failed 
when it was not supported by a robust politics; in doing so it deemphasized and 
marginalized the positive elements of law and legal culture that were always 
implicit in an ambivalent conception.  But in a world of executive arrogance, 
authoritarian posturing, and blatant disregard for rule of law values, those 
elements must necessarily  come to the fore in any critical account.  Critical 
scholars have prided themselves on their deconstructive acumen – their ability to 
elucidate the hidden and marginalized values and assumptions that bodies of legal 
doctrine deemphasized but on which they secretly depended.  We should apply 
those same deconstructive techniques to critical legal theory itself. 
 
  The focus of a critical approach to law—and its ambivalent conception— 
will inevitably shift as we introduce it into new contexts of judgment. 
Deemphasized aspects will emerge. Sometimes a critical approach to law will 
focus on how rule of law norms, legal institutions, and legal culture serve 
important political values; but not because law is independent from politics, or 
because law does not apologize for and legitimate injustices.  Rather, legal culture 
and institutions are valuable to critical theories of law because they are a way of 
doing politics, in the sense of shaping, restraining and challenging power. 
 
In like fashion, a critical approach will not view the rule of law as simply 
a formal legal principle— for example, the requirement that like cases must be 
treated alike. Nor should one confuse it with a formalist hope that if we design 
legal doctrines carefully enough, they can conclusively determine all important 
and contested cases or  prevent all injustices and abuses.  Rather, the rule of law, 
like liberty or equality, is a political value. It is a value one struggles for and 
struggles with.  It demands that legal institutions and professional culture should 
work to restrain the arbitrary and unjust exercise of power, and that we should 
build, preserve and protect legal and social institutions to that end.  Like most 
political principles, the principle of the rule of law does not determine the scope 
of its own extension; hence it can be fought over, and co-opted.  But like other 
political principles—such as human dignity or equality—it is no less valuable to 
social life because it is underdetermined and co-optable. 
 
 History deconstructs; it shows how the conceptions of the past appear ever 
different in ever new contexts, how things we once thought naturally opposed are 
now joined together, and how things we thought were indelibly joined together 
now come apart.  So it is with critical theories of law: in one era a critical 
approach lets us understand law’s threat, in another, it reveals law’s promise.  The 
British historian E.P. Thompson famously argued that the rule of law was an 




unqualified human good.10  A unqualified good it will not be, at least to the 
ambivalent conception, for there always lurks the danger that law will become a 
form of idolatry and a technology of oppression. Yet there is no doubt that law 
and the rule of law are genuine human goods and indispensable elements in a 
humane civilization.  It does not take a critical theory of law to recognize that 
fact. But without recognizing it, no theory of law can truly be critical. 
 
 
                                                          
10 E.P. Thompson, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 266, 267 (1975); for a 
critique, see Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE L. J. 
561, 566 (1977). 
